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A Commentary on Ritual and the Production of Crime Control Policy 
in New Zealand	
	
Juan Marcellos Tauri 
	
Abstract 
This commentary highlights the way(s) that ritual plays a significant 
role in the development of crime control policy in New Zealand.  The 
actions of New Zealand’s crime control policy sector is chosen as the 
focus for the commentary because of its ability to significantly impact 
individuals and communities through its close relationship with 
Cabinet, the development and implementation of legislation, and 
access to significant financial resources.  A further motivation is the 
authors’ desire to demystify the heavily ritualised, mythological 
context that surrounds the policy process and that aids in screening 
their work from critical scrutiny.  The importance of ritual in the 
contemporary New Zealand policy sector will be demonstrated 
through discussion of the Organised Crime Strategy developed in 
2007.  
 





The meaning of ritual is great indeed.  He who tried to enter it with 
the uncouth and inane theories of the system-makers will perish there.   
Xunzi (3rd Century B.C). 
 
I wish to begin this article by positioning myself within the context of the rituals 
of policy making in New Zealand: In 1999 I left the Academy and spent ten 
years working in various government agencies including the Ministry of Māori 
Development, Ministry of Social Development and Department of Corrections.  
The majority of my time was spent working on criminal justice and social sector 
policy, and interacting with a range of agencies, including the Ministries of 
Justice, Police, Corrections, Internal Affairs, Housing, and Department for 
Prime Minister and Cabinet.  I participated in a number of inter-agency 
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committees and projects, most notably the Youth Offending Strategy (2002), 
Crime Reduction Strategy (2002), Effective Interventions (2006) and Drivers of 
Crime (2009/10).  I use this experience to provide a critical discussion of the 
rituals that underpin policy-making activity in the crime control sector New 
Zealand government.   
          I have chosen to focus on the activities of the Policy Industry for the 
following reasons; firstly, because through its close relationship with Cabinet, 
the development of legislation and access to extensive resources, the policy 
sector has the ability to significantly impact our lives; and secondly to demystify 
the mythological and ritualistic world policy makers are encapsulated within.  
This construct assists in protecting the policy sector from external scrutiny and 
maintaining authority over the way social (policy) problems are defined and 
responded to.  I evidence my critique by referring to a specific case study I 
participated in while working in New Zealand’s policy sector, namely the 
Organised Crime Strategy, an inter-agency project led by the Ministry of Justice 
(Ministry of Justice, 2008; see also New Zealand Police, 2010).  
 
Policy Development in New Zealand 
Broadly speaking policy development can be understood as an institutionally-
driven practice that is contextualised and codified in various written forms.  It is 
the process through which government identifies and actions responses they 
believe will improve key social and economic indicators (e.g. increased overall 
youth educational attainment or reduce unemployment) (Althaus, Bridgman & 
Davis, 2007).  The process of policy making is facilitated through various 
bureaucratic actions including Cabinet papers, budgets, legislation, regulations 
and other administrative practices that have formed the basis of policy making 
in Western democracies for most of the last sixty years (Schick, 1996).  
However, over the past decade the policy sector has been significantly impacted 
by the rise of two inter-related movements, managerialism and evidence-based 
policy (EBP) (Reid, 2003). 
 
The (re)construction of contemporary policy development processes 
In the mid-1990s, New Zealand’s policy sector began building on developments 
in the United Kingdom to conduct a co-ordinated process of modernisation.  
This involved implementing of a range of techniques that proponents believed 
would enhance the efficiency of the policy process.  These ranged from 
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alterations in performance measurement, such as moving from reporting on 
outputs (i.e. the number of clients serviced) to outcomes (i.e. quantifiable 
evidence of the impact of policies, spending and interventions), and enhanced 
inter-agency co-operation across intersecting portfolios (e.g. criminal justice, 
welfare and health) (Schick, 1996; see also Cheyne & Belgrave, 2005).  In 
short, New Zealand’s public service underwent a process of modernisation that 
brought its operations into line with the theories and practices of 
managerialism; an approach to policy development that had been gaining 
popularity in other western, neo-liberal jurisdictions.  Trinder (2000: 18) states 
that the managerialist ethos emphases value for money and focuses on 
“effectiveness and efficiency [as] a central driving force behind… policy”.  
Through the managerialist movement government agencies and providers 
contracted to deliver services on their behalf, were expected to quantify what 
they were doing, why they did ‘it’, and whether or not ‘it’ was working.   
          The influence of the managerialist movement on New Zealand’s public 
service was boosted by the development of the evidence-based policy or EBP 
movement in the United Kingdom in the mid-1990s (Bullock, Mountford & 
Stanley, 2001).  Evidence-based policy has been described as a technical 
approach to policy making that places empirically-generated evidence at the 
heart of policy development.  The types of evidence privileged in the EBP 
environment are quantitative, scientific methods, such as randomised clinical 
trials, statistical meta-analysis and systematic, large-scale reviews.  The power 
of EBP to influence the policy sector derives from the role it can play in 
combating one of the key concerns of the modernisers, namely the perception 
that policy-making until the mid-1990s was dominated by the “untested views 
of individuals or groups, often inspired by ideological standpoints, prejudices, 
or speculative conjecture” (Davies, 2004: 3).  In contrast, modernisers sought a 
policy process based on evidence of what works to produce positive social 
outcomes.  In their view, the only valid knowledge for informing policy is 
derived from scientific, objective observations of the social context (Schick, 
1996).  Thus 21st century New Zealand is supposedly blessed with a ‘scientific 
policy endeavour’ that ensures that the tax payer is receiving value for the 
significant resources allocated every year to the industry.  
 
Ritual and Myth-Building and Maintenance in New Zealand’s Policy 
Sector 
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In a chapter on the public service in New Zealand, Shaw (2006) describes a 
scene from the popular 1980s television series Yes Minister in which Sir 
Humphrey Appleby, a senior public servant, is leading his hapless Minister in 
circles by obfuscating on the question of whether or not a certain investigation 
had taken place.  Those who remember the series might recall that two of the 
core premises were that the public service was the real power behind 
government, and public servants purposely employed a range of (devious) 
techniques to ensure this situation continued.  Upon reflection, Shaw (2006: 
273) states that: 
At one level Yes Minister and its sequel, Yes Prime Minister, make for 
witty, well-crafted viewing.  But at another they promoted a jaundiced 
view of public servants that is not, and perhaps never has been, a fair 
or accurate depiction of the role of public servants. 
I disagree with the substance of Shaw’s argument: While it is inaccurate to 
depict the public service in New Zealand as an entity that is at all times 
manipulative, nevertheless in my experience the behaviour represented in the 
British television series was just as commonplace, and sometimes far more 
manipulative, than that carried out by Sir Humphrey and his fictional 
colleagues.  The manipulation of Cabinet Ministers, other government agencies 
and the public is common practice across the policy sector.  Furthermore, the 
degree and nature of the obfuscation and manipulation often correlates to the 
potential for political damage of a particular issue, or the ability (or more 
usually the lack thereof) of specific agencies and officials.  The motivation, 
perhaps even the necessity for manipulation and obfuscation can be easily 
understood if we recognise that what is at stake is something more important to 
senior public servants than their significant salaries, namely access to political 
power through their ability to direct the policy process (Hass, 2004, see also 
Tauri, 20914a; 2014b)).  And, as will be demonstrated in this commentary, what 
could be more helpful to the attainment and maintenance of power, than the 
intertwined processes of ritual, myth-building and maintenance? 
 
Ritual(s) in organisational culture 
Alvesson and Billing (1997: 125; see also Kertzer, 1989) describe three basic 
formulations through which corporate culture is expressed and reproduced, i) 
through artefacts - physical objects like furniture, logos, and dress that convey 
meaning within an organisation; and ii) through metaphors –“culturally rich 
verbal expressions”, or verbal symbols, “creating vocabularies to facilitate and 
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guide interpretations” of organisational activity, and lastly, through rituals.  In 
Alvessen and Billing’s schema rituals are activities that occur within and 
between corporate operators, corporations or institutions and ‘outsiders’ (such 
as the general public as consumers of corporate products) that include certain 
repetitive patterns which contain symbolic and expressive elements that confirm 
existing (or newly constituted) power relations, institutional values and 
attitudes.  This type of functionalist analysis of ritual considers institutionalised 
ritual(s) as activities used to communicate organisational norms and mark those 
who are part of the institution itself (Jones & Sergot, 1995).  However, 
institutionalised rituals are often as much about who or what is excluded from 
the ‘club’ and therefore from power, as who is ‘in’ (Meyer & Scott, 2009).   
          Suk-Young (2009: 3) contends that ritual(s) is an important feature of 
organisational culture and corporate activity because of the part it plays in 
overcoming “coordination problems” and ensuring individuals and agencies 
agree on the core ethics, principles and goals that drive organisational activity.  
Further, Suk-Young (ibid: 26) makes the pertinent observation that: 
If one calls [a] meeting a “ritual”, then according to our argument, the 
purpose of a ritual is to form the common knowledge necessary for 
solving a coordination problem [see also Islam and Zyphur, 2009 and 
Smircich & Stubbart, 1985]. 
The importance of ritual to developing processes for responding to ‘co-
ordination problems’, especially inter-agency conflict, is demonstrated in the 
development of the Crime Reduction Strategy in the early 2000s.  I was 
informed by an ex-colleague working at the Ministry of Justice, an agency that 
the Ministry I worked for was in regular conflict with over its approach to Maori 
issues, that during the development of the strategy, justice officials would hold 
pre-meeting meetings to develop strategies to deal with, and hopefully dominate 
conflict they anticipated would occur in meetings with us.  In a ritual 
reminiscent of common scenes in war movies, Ministry officials would gather to 
discuss their ‘intelligence’ on our position and the composite of our team, to 
identify our strengths and weaknesses, determine their likely plan of attack and 
create strategies designed to protect their perceived policy ‘high ground’.  
Various officials would be designated to lead specific attacks (or defences) and 
would be invited to participate in the conflict by the ‘General’ (in this case the 
highest ranking Ministry official) at pre-determined points during hostilities.   
          The war metaphors are quite apt in this case; I and my colleagues from 
the Ministry of Māori Development were often left bemused as we observed the 
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heavily scripted, ritualised defensive strategies being deployed by criminal 
justice officials.  As such, it might be more accurate therefore to think of formal, 
public service interagency meetings as a platform or theatrical vehicle that 
enables the performance of ritual between policy makers (Lea, 2009).  It is an 
often heavily prescribed, coordinated site of interaction that compels performers 
to forestall or overcome potential coordination problems, collectivise normally 
disparate policy and decision-making processes, and to construct and support 
myths that empower them and their agencies.   
 
Ritual, myth and power 
Building on the previous discussion, in the policy context ritual is enacted in 
part through micro-political ceremonies involving established/agreed 
vocabularies, symbolic gestures and codified texts, usually produced in writing 
in the form of ministerial briefing papers, meeting minutes and cabinet papers.  
This body of work, borne from ritual, enables policy workers and their disparate 
institutions to formulate common knowledge of, and approaches to, identified 
social problems, and to anticipate the ‘right conduct’ necessary for working 
together to manage them.  Furthermore, it can be argued that ritual also serves to 
support the myth of a political neutral public service, mask the power and 
authority that lies in the hands of a large, unelected body of policy technocrats, 
and lastly, to insulate the policy industry from the gaze of critical commentators, 
such as the media and the academy.  In the following section I utilise a case 
study to demonstrate the role of ritual in developing and maintaining two of the 
core myths of the Policy Industry within the New Zealand context, the myth of 
political neutrality, and the myth of the primacy of evidence.   
 
Myth and Policy Development 
What have myths to do with policy making?  In my experience the policy sector 
is overall, genuinely committed to the aims of evidence-based, politically 
neutral, policy-making.  Unfortunately, those aims are difficult to achieve and 
maintain in what is in reality an industry heavily dependent on an “alternative 
dimension of myth” to mask the reality of its ideologically-driven, politicised 
activities (Herzog and Abel, 2009: 4).  I argue that myth-making in policy 
making is reflective of the gap and tension between the ‘ought’ and ‘is’ of 
institutional, bureaucratic practice.  Accordingly, it is a duplicitous activity 
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where “... the ought provides a fantasised or glamorised ideal that the is of 
practices should be achieving” (ibid.: 4).   
          The creation and maintenance of myth can be said to be foundational to 
the art of policy-making because of the important part it plays in “mediating 
opposition” and “justifying decisions regarding major issues” (ibid: 5).  
Therefore, myth-maintenance (supported by ritual) is particularly helpful in 
policy-making for taming internal coordination problems (i.e., competition 
within and between agencies for finite resources) and external one’s (i.e., 
nullifying the potentially politically damaging impact of independent, public 
scrutiny) “because myths, by their very nature, disguise and manage the 
emotional impact of the stories they tell” (ibid: 5), and often play a useful role in 
hiding the ‘real story’ behind the intent and likely impact of specific policies. 
 
Ritual and the Myths of Political Neutrality and the Primacy of Evidence 
One of my all-time favourite movies is Usual Suspects, released in 1995.  The 
film contains a number of memorable scenes and lines of dialogue, but the one 
that has stuck in my mind is probably the most often quoted: “the greatest trick 
the devil ever played was convincing the world he didn’t exist”.  This quote 
refers to the deceptive practices employed by the ‘Evil One’ to divert attention 
away from the role he/she plays in the madness and pain of everyday life.  A 
similar deceit on the part of New Zealand’s Policy Industry is its on-going 
attempts to convince both the public and its political masters that it is politically 
neutral.  In my experience the Policy Industry is much more successful in this 
endeavour with the public, while most politicians are well aware of the 
politicised nature of the public service.  
          I qualify my comments, however, by acknowledging that some members 
of the public service, in particular those doing the technical work (the ‘policy 
proletariat’), try their best to adhere to the public service code of conduct and 
the theoretical and practice bases of EBP.  However, in my experience - apart 
from the odd exception – policy-making is a fraught process which requires 
practitioners to continuously compromise these core values.  Why?  Because 
contemporary policy making in New Zealand is not much different from the 
supposed bad old days of opinion-based policy that existed before the rise of 
EBP: It is no less ideological than it ever was, and it is certainly far from the 
objective, politically neutral beast its exponents claim. 
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          There are a number of ways we can evidence the argument that the Policy 
Industry is political: firstly, it is taken as a given that a number of the public 
service are members of registered political parties.  Some keep their political 
affiliations to themselves; while others openly declare them as is encouraged 
under the Public Service Code of Conduct (PSCC) (State Services Commission, 
2007).  The PCSS stipulates that while it is the right of all policy workers to 
affiliate politically they must be circumspect when carrying out duties on behalf 
of any political entity.  More significantly it is possible to argue that the public 
service is wedded to the political system through the fact that officials and 
institutions are compelled to implement the policy agenda of the Government of 
the day.  The myth of the political neutrality of the public service is built in part 
on the fact that the PSCC directs officials to give full and frank advice to 
government ministers.  What this should mean in practice is that if existing 
evidence does not support the policy directives from Cabinet and indeed may 
harm the public, then it is the duty of public servants to advise Ministers of this 
fact.  However, in my experience this rarely happens, especially in the crime 
control sector, and when it does it is often more about protecting the reputation 
and resources of the agency and their Ministers, than the public.   
          The political nature of the Policy Industry is, however, much more 
insidious and far reaching than these benign examples demonstrate.  The 
Industry can be charged with being political and partisan via the fact that while 
directed by Cabinet and beholden to it, it holds extensive power over the 
development and implementation of policy itself.  If you live in Wellington, New 
Zealand and work in the Industry long enough, you will hear politicians and 
media (and sometimes, but rarely, policy workers) state that policy is not made 
or dictated by Cabinet, but is controlled by the policy mandarins in the small 
geographical triangle that takes in the parliamentary precinct, the Terrace and 
much of Lambton Quay.  This point is often made tongue-in-cheek, but my 
experience is that it holds true in many cases.  The myth of political neutrality 
masks two sub-surface truisms that are not easily observed by external 
audiences, but are well known within agencies.  These are that i) part of the ‘art 
of politics’ and therefore of policy-making (which is the textual articulation of 
political theory/ideology) is a theoretical or conceptual framework for 
explaining the world and how it works; ii) while individual members of 
agencies will have their own ‘theory of the world’, agencies utilise specific 
theoretical paradigms that match their institutional view of how the world 
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works, and form the ideological bases for policy development.  For example, 
neo-liberal economics has been the dominant political and economic 
theory/philosophy for the development of economic policy by New Zealand’s 
Treasury agency since the mid-1980s (Treasury, 2001); the Psychology of 
Criminal Conduct is the dominant theoretical paradigm informing the 
development of prison policy by the Department of Corrections from the mid-
1990s (Department of Corrections, 2013); and a form of neo-tribal orthodoxy 
underpins policy making in the Ministry of Māori Development (2013); and iii) 
agencies employ various rituals and associated activities that either mask the 
theoretical underpinnings of their processes or are used to validate them over 
competing discourses. 
 
Case study: the Organised Crime Strategy 
To demonstrate the political nature of policy making and the myth of the 
primacy of evidence, we need look no further than the highly inflammatory 
issue of gangs and crime.  On 7 May 2007, a two year old girl was murdered in 
Wanganui, the victim of a gang-related drive-by-shooting.  Understandably the 
incident caused outrage amongst the wider public and politicians.  Through the 
media, public figures, such as the Mayor of Wanganui, Michael Laws, called for 
‘something to be done’ about the perceived violence and general lawlessness of 
ethnic gangs in the region (Wanganui District Council, 2007).  The 
Government’s response was swift: just a few days after the incident, public 
service officials were called upon by Ministers to brief them on the issues and 
potentially effective policy options.  Up to that point the only meaningful, albeit 
largely ineffective, policy initiatives in place were the Ministry of Social 
Development-led inter-agency project called the Plan of Action: Improving 
Outcomes for Young People in Counties Manukau (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2007) and a joint Ministry of Māori Development/New Zealand 
Police project which utilised established (adult) gang leaders to mediate directly 
with so-called youth gangs in an attempt to dampen tensions and reduce the 
potential for further violent confrontation between these groups.  The reality 
was that over the preceding decade or more, the crime control and social policy 
sectors had an unwritten rule of not working with gangs, meaning no funding 
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for gang members to develop social programmes or support for activities that 
involved gang members or their associates1.   
          Officials’ response to requests from Ministers about how best to respond 
to the Wanganui incident was to revive the grossly overdue Organised Crime 
Strategy (OCS) (Ministry of Justice, 2002) that was initially part of the larger 
Crime Reduction Strategy signed off by the Labour government in May 2001.  
The Strategy identified seven priority areas for the wider criminal justice sector, 
of which organised crime was designated Priority Area 5 (family violence and 
community violence and sexual violence were priority areas one and two).  By 
the time of the Wanganui gang shooting priority area five was the least 
developed, and certainly any formal strategy was by then almost six years 
overdue. 
          Work began in earnest on resurrecting the OCS in mid-2007.  It involved 
some of the usual strategies, tactics and rituals officials utilise in order to be 
seen to be busy when potentially nasty coordination problems arise in the public 
sector: firstly, lead agencies were empowered (in this case, Ministry of Justice, 
followed closely by the New Zealand Police); other important players were 
identified (for example, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Ministry of 
Social Development, and to a lesser extent the Ministries of Māori Development 
and Pacific Island Affairs); an inter-agency group established; a schedule of 
meetings agreed, along with priority work items (background papers, briefings 
to Ministers, Cabinet papers, etc.) and tasks identified and allocated.  Given the 
political capital inherent in the gang-related incident in Wanganui, work on 
developing the OCS was given priority by Government, and therefore by 
participating agencies.  The fact that the lead agencies had failed to deliver on 
																																								 																				
1	 	There are a few exceptions to this rule, for example some District Health Boards in New 
Zealand have funded patched gang members to deliver services, such as information on 
immunisation programmes, in recognition of the difficulties government agencies often have 
in accessing ‘hard to reach’ communities.  However, in my experience such enlightened 
thinking in the Policy Industry is rare, and more often the response is puerile.  Take for 
example the way that government officials behaved towards the Wellington-based youth 
worker, Eugene Ryder.  Eugene is a former member of the Black Power and is now 
acknowledged as an effective youth worker, including by some police officers who work with 
youth offenders.  Eugene works with the ‘hard to reach’ youth, those either members of, or 
moving towards involvement with gangs.  In 2008 Eugene was invited to give a talk at a 
youth conference scheduled to be held in Wellington.  Unfortunately one of the main 
sponsors of the conference, the Ministry of Social Development, made it known that any 
future involvement or funding by them would possibly cease if Eugene spoke at the 
conference.  The Ministry made the demand despite the fact that it had, at that time, lead 
responsibility for developing supposedly effective youth gang policy.   
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the promised organised crime strategy for some two to three years was never 
discussed at formal meetings and was overlooked in official documentation.  
Regardless, this overdue strategic item provided agencies with a vehicle through 
which they could be seen to be responding meaningfully to what Cabinet clearly 
considered to be a politically-charged, perhaps even electorally damaging social 
issue. 
          So where does ritual fit into this particular case study?  All of the above 
strategies and activities can be viewed, individually or collectively, as rituals of 
(in) activity.  In the event of a highly charged, political issue arising, agencies 
(individually or collectively) swing into ‘action’, utilising the well-established 
rituals of activity outlined above to serve as markers of responsiveness, concern 
for public safety and expertise.  The long overdue OCS became a policy 
platform through which officials and agencies could demonstrate their ability to 
respond quickly and efficiently.  Having no doubt briefed Minister(s) on the 
situation, including claiming that the Strategy was an appropriate and effective 
mechanism for responding to the Wanganui incident, officials then moved to 
deploy another set of rituals, referred to here as the rituals of deception.  This 
set of rituals is commonly used by criminal justice officials who need to retrofit 
policy to a social issue for which it is unsuited. 
          Rituals of deception are common in situations of policy retrofitting.  They 
enable officials and agencies to mask the fact that their activities are more about 
managing potential coordination problems than about constructing meaningful 
‘real world’ solutions.  The coordination problems that were the target of the 
OCS-related rituals of deception were masking a long-overdue piece of strategic 
work, the historical lack of meaningful policy response to gang-related violence 
and gangs per se, and the failure of the preferred suppression and surveillance 
policies since the mid-1980s to solve the so-called gang problem.  All of these 
coordination problems carry the potential to negatively impact institutional 
credibility with Cabinet and the public, and inter-agency relationships.   
 
So, why the deceit? 
There are a number of ways to explain and understand why supposedly neutral 
policy mandarins become involved in the politics of policy and utilise rituals of 
(in)activity and deception.  At base level it has to do with affinity and access: 
the higher up the managerial decision-making structure one gets, the closer you 
are to the political decision-making process and the politicians who ultimately 
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make those decisions.  Accordingly, the more one has ready access to political 
authority, the more attention one pays to the political consequences of policy 
design and implementation.  In other words, the higher up the management food 
chain you move the less concerned with the technical development of policy 
you become and the more you focus on what is referred to in Wellington as the 
‘front page of the Dominion Post test’: namely, how will a particular policy or 
policy issue look or be represented by the media?  A further issue for 
consideration is what is the risk of negative media publicity to Cabinet and the 
policy sector?  In other words, senior managers can be viewed as political 
commissars who carry out the dual roles of educating the technocrats on the 
political expectations of Cabinet and the Ministry, and providing political risk 
assessment and protection services for Chief Executives, their agencies and 
Cabinet Ministers.   
          Of course, it can be countered that the argument I present here robs policy 
workers of their ‘agency’.  However this position presupposes that policy 
workers are empowered to carry out independent articulation of ‘free thought’ 
in the politically charged environment of a policy shop to begin with.  My 
experience was that this was rare and most definitely discouraged.  The reality 
of the policy environment and the position of the policy proletariat is effectively 
summarised by legal theorist Stanley Fish (1989: 141) who describes 
professional analysts not as free agents, but as "embedded practitioners" whose 
values, canons of evidence, normative measures and theoretical schema are 
proscribed by his or her professional community.  As a result, I contend that the 
adherence of some policy workers, especially those in high level management 
positions, to the supposed core policy principles of objectivity and political 
neutrality, can be significantly impacted by their proximity to political power.   
          The policy commissars and their direct line managers, who may be 
referred to collectively as the Policy Elite, have the unenviable task of adhering 
to and implementing the policy platforms of incoming (newly elected) 
governments, along with new policy initiatives dreamt up by the current 
government.  This can be a nightmare at times, especially if the government’s 
policy goes against the majority or all of the available research evidence, as 
often occurs in the criminal justice sector (see below).  The case study of the 
OCS and policy response to the Wanganui incident, foremost highlights the 
myth of the political neutrality of the public service.  This example underlines 
the role of ritual in masking the way(s) in which officials and agencies will bow 
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to political and media pressure and construct policy responses ill-suited to the 
specific social issue that is dominating front page news at a particular time.  
When observed from afar, this type of ritualised response to the potential for 
‘bad publicity’ may appear crude, but it can be supported by more sophisticated 
rituals.  In the case study discussed here, it included a set of pre-conceived 
activities that provided the policy response with a ‘veil of scienticism’, that 
effectively maintains the myth of the primacy of evidence in the policy-making 
context. 
 
The OCS and the myth of the primacy of evidence in New Zealand policy 
making 
According to the myth of the primacy of evidence, policy-making in New 
Zealand is founded on the use of empirical evidence to develop effective 
solutions to real world problems.  There are times when this appears to be an 
accurate description of the link between research-generated knowledge and 
policy development, particularly in policy sectors such as education and health.  
My experience of the EBP process within the crime control sector is that while 
from time-to-time relevant evidence plays a part in policy construction, more 
often than not rituals of deception are favoured.  There is also a tendency 
towards utilising a preconceived strategy of importing and implementing 
policies from other western jurisdictions (Tauri, 2013), regardless of the lack of 
evidence that these interventions would work in the New Zealand context (the 
recent introduction of boot camps for youth offenders a recent example), a 
practice that clearly breaches core principles of EBP, including that policies and 
interventions are clearly suited to the social context to which they are been 
imported (Tauri, 2009). 
        Without doubt, empirically-derived evidence is important to the 
development of policy in the New Zealand context.  However, it is the point at 
which evidence is gathered and pre-determined decisions made about what 
evidence to use, that diminishes the Industry’s claims to be working in a 
politically neutral, EBP environment.  In terms of the OCS, core agencies went 
to great pains to retrofit the urban/ethnic gang issues onto a policy mechanism 
focussed (largely) on a fundamentally different gang-related issue altogether, 
namely the related issues of organised (international) crime cartels and 
terrorism.  Part of this process included a whole set of rituals of deception 
focused on the use (non-use) of evidence.   
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          Generally, the policy development process in the crime control context is 
characterised as following a fairly straightforward process: the policy problem 
identified or received → policy industry formulates ‘plan of action’ → 
background/policy papers developed including (if necessary) identifying a range 
of responses/interventions → review of existing research and evidence of the 
effectiveness of range of intervention options.  The last stage in this linear 
process, the review of evidence, can be considered one of the primary sites for 
the practice of rituals of deceit.  In reality the process often looks like this: 
framing the policy (research) question → preconception of the acceptable 
parameters of the research review based on predetermined factors, including 
agency ideological/theoretical paradigm (e.g. the Department of Correction’s 
Psychology of Criminal Conduct), policy commissars assessment of political 
climate and/or Ministers’ policy directives → predetermined decisions/findings 
→ selection and privileging of, existing evidence in support of pre-determined 
policy solutions.   
          As a Ministry of Māori Development official, my colleagues and I 
identified significant weaknesses in background papers developed to resuscitate 
the overdue OCS.  Firstly, the retrofitting process had resulted in weak analysis 
by core agency officials in terms of ‘fitting’ the street gang issue within an 
organised crime strategy.  The best example of this was their attempt to create a 
continuum of organised crime that ended with the usual transnational crime 
conglomerates (international drug cartels, etc.), and began with ‘youth street 
gangs’, or more accurately what Ministry officials referred to as a ‘small group 
of loosely affiliated youth who hang out in public together’ (a touch team 
perhaps?  Maybe youth choir members going home from church?).  Officials 
then attempted to create some solidity around the continuum in order to 
rationalise the inclusion of the various organised crime groups.  At the ‘high 
end’ (links between national drug organisations and international drug cartels) 
the evidential base was loose, yet the arguments for significant linkages was at 
least plausible.  However, the further down the hierarchy of gang structure they 
moved the more the evidence becomes vague and inconclusive, and ultimately 
non-existent.  At this point in the policy process, evidence was replaced by 
unsupported suppositions, rationalised as ‘best guesses’ employed to retrofit the 
then evolving youth gang ‘crisis’ on to a strategy for serious organised crime.   
          This fact came as no surprise to Ministry of Māori Development officials 
like myself, who had read the existing New Zealand and international literature 
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on gangs and criminality, and found no firm evidence in New Zealand of major 
links between ‘street gatherings of youth’ and organised national/international 
drug cartels.  Furthermore, a significant number of studies demonstrated that 
most youth gatherings did not fit the definition of a gang developed by officials 
(Ministry of Social Development, 2007).  In fact, the greater majority of so-
called Māori, Pasifika and Pākehā (European) youth gang members were 
unlikely to become involved in organised crime or to graduate to adult ethnic 
gangs (ibid).  Through numerous interdepartmental comments to core OCS 
agencies we repeatedly used the availing evidence to critique the evolving 
policy position.  Furthermore, we implored justice officials to base their policies 
and the eventual strategy on existing empirical evidence, or, if not, to provide 
evidence that supported the position they were taking.  Of course none was 
forthcoming as it either did not exist, or what did exist did not support their 
position.  Instead, officials’ excluded elements of definitions and research that 
contradicted their argument, something I and my colleagues encountered 
frequently in the Policy Industry and began to call the ‘cherry-picking ritual’. 
          At one stage we strongly challenged the definitional work on what did 
(and did not) constitute organised crime, citing numerous international 
definitions that demonstrated the fallacy they were creating by including youth, 
and even ethnic gangs, as key components of the OCS.  In response, officials 
countered by citing the United Nations definition and argued that it allowed for 
such inclusions.  In fact, it did no such thing, as our commentary below 
demonstrates: 
Paragraph 12: only part of the United Nations (UN) definition of 
organised crime is used.  What is missing is the second part, which 
stipulates the types of behaviours and activities that would fall within 
the purview of ‘organised crime’ (such as illicit traffic in narcotic 
drugs, traffic in persons, etc.).  In developing the draft convention for 
the suppression of transnational organised crime, the United Nations 
purposely undertook to develop a ‘specific’ definition, in order to 
avoid having such a broad definition that violations of human rights 
would occur (e.g., enabling states to utilise organised crime 
legislation/responses to target non-organised crime ‘organisations’ 
such as youth/ethnic ‘gangs’) (taken from Ministry of Māori 
Development inter-agency comment on Ministry of Justice Cabinet 
paper). 
Cherry-picking evidence to suit a pre-conceived policy position is driven largely 
by the policy commissars with one eye on the external political context 
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(meaning media scrutiny), and both ears bent to a Minister’s poll-driven 
rhetoric.  It is a ritualised process that is most evident when witnessed directly 
via input into policy development, or indirectly as an external policy 
commentator who receives the paper/briefing as part of the standard inter-
agency or Cabinet consultation process – otherwise it largely remains for the 
most part hidden from the public and the media.  I argue that while policy 
making is sometimes influenced by relevant evidence, much of the evidence 
used is carefully (pre)selected to support the policy position of the current 
government and/or the preferred theoretical paradigm of specific institutions.  
The rituals of deception thus play a key role in allowing officials and agencies 
to present to themselves, to other policy workers, Cabinet and the public the 
illusion that ‘a ‘scientific’, empirically-informed process is informing the 
development of crime control policy in New Zealand.   
          Evidence–based policy is perhaps best understood as simply a new 
technique that has been added to the tool box utilised by those working in the 
Policy Industry to define/control potentially politically disruptive social issues 
in line with their understanding of the social and political context.  The rituals 
of deceit serve to ensure that any policy solutions are constructed in line with 
that understanding and remain within the control of the policy sector to define 
social problems and the solutions to them.  Perhaps we might best understand 
this deceit by taking a policy-as-discourse approach that “frames policy not as a 
response to existing conditions and problems, but more as a discourse in which 
both problems and solutions are created” (Bacchi, 2000: 48).  In this schema, 
policy-making becomes a process through which potentially damaging 
coordination issues (such as the gang shooting in Wanganui) enable officials to 
control the process of problem definition and problem solving.  However, the 
primary goal of the Policy Industry, at least in the criminal control sector, is not 
to solve social problems, but instead to reframe social issues and policy in such 
a way that the power to define and respond to them remain within the political 
sphere they belong to.  By so doing, the Industry is able to mediate the extent to 
which crime control agencies and present and former governments become the 
focus of critical analysis of the causes of significant social problems, such as 
crime.  If we understand the actions of criminal justice officials in trying to 
retrofit the ethnic gang and youth congregation issues onto the OCS in this light, 
then we might readily identify with Edelman’s (1988: 16) definition of policy as 
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“…. a set of shifting, diverse, and contradictory responses to a spectrum of 
political interests”.   
          Of course, we must acknowledge that the case study discussed here 
occurred in the mid to late 2000s.  A good eight years have passed since then, so 
there is always the possibility that the policy sector has significantly altered the 
way it does it business.  Sadly, more recent crime control policy projects 
demonstrate that this is not the case.  The policy sectors preference for ritual and 
unevidenced policy responses to crime control issues prevails.  Take for 
example the attempted ‘ritual’ evisceration of criminologist and gang 
researcher, Jarrod Gilbert in 2014.  His crime was to expose then Minister of 
Police Anne Tolley’s release of wildly inaccurate gang-related crime figures: 
where Tolley and New Zealand Police claimed gang members were responsible 
for 34 per cent of class A/B drug offences and 25 per cent of all homicides, the 
reality was 4 and 0 per cent respectively (see Gilbert, 2014).  Why should this 
issue be of concern?  Because as Gilbert (2014) rightly points out, figures such 
as these form part of the evidence base, the rationale for significant policy (and 
often legislative) responses to wicked social problems, like gangs and ‘gang 
crime’.  In this case it provided support for a ‘whole of government’ gang 
response, including the development of a Gang Intelligence Centre, and 
deploying drug dogs at domestic transit points (Fisher, 2014); meaning that 
policy constructed on false data and ideological grandstanding can and does 
have real consequences for us all. 
          I am aware that in updating the policy response to the key issues here, 
namely gangs and organised crime, that I have provided an incomplete sketch.  
That is unavoidable given word constraints.  But I believe that these recent 
examples demonstrate that the crime control sector continues to respond to 
issues like gangs and organised crime as it has for a long time now, by fudging 
of data and exaggerating and misrepresenting the extent of the ‘gang-crime 
problem’, by selective, biased deployment of ‘research’ support preconceived 
policies and continuing on with the unethical and unhelpful edict to not 
meaningfully engage with ‘hard to reach’ communities.  In the absence of a 
depoliticised crime control policy process, is it any wonder that policy makers 
continue to deploy the stock of rituals designed to shore up myths that are 
essential to the continued hegemony of the sector over the construction of 
responses to significant social issues?  
 




Those working in New Zealand’s criminal justice policy sector weld significant 
power.  And the power they have to control the development and 
implementation of crime control policy can have a profound effect on our daily 
lives.  When we merge this fact with the realisation that all this power sits with 
a large group of unelected individuals and the agencies they represent, our duty 
to expose the processes they use to develop policy, legislation and interventions 
becomes clear.  Despite the grandiose claims of the policy sector regarding the 
Public Service Code of Conduct and their adherence to the overarching principle 
of political neutrality, it is very much a politically-motivated and focused 
process.  This point may seem laboured, but it is an important one to underline 
when considering the connections between ritual and policy making.  This is 
because a large amount of the intellectual and rhetorical work that underpins the 
rituals of the Industry is aimed at supporting the intertwined mythologies of 
political neutrality, and the primacy of evidence-based policy.  These rituals aid 
in masking inherent power struggles between bureaucratic agencies over ever-
decreasing resources and its parasitic relationship to the political elite. 
          The case study discussed in this commentary highlights the extent to 
which ritual forms an important element in the policy-making process.  It was 
selected to demonstrate the support ritual provides to the key myths of New 
Zealand public service. I have also been purposely critical (or ‘negative’, if you 
are a senior public servant), as this reflects my experiences of the policy 
industry, and to counter the overly positive spin that dominates agency 
publications, Cabinet papers and self-generated research.  Shaw (2006) does 
have a point, the public service is not always the self-serving, manipulative 
institution portrayed in Yes Minister.  However, its use of ritual and myth-
maintenance to shore up its authority over policy-making and response to social 
issues diminishes the oft-made claims by the policy elite of their political 
neutrality, and the importance of evidence in creating meaningful policies for 
significant social issues.   
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